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Introduction 
The uprising which took place in Tunisia in 2010 made dramatically visible the scale 
and problematic status of the Arab world’s youth population.  The demands of young 
protesters reflected profound frustrations over issues which perhaps most pertinently 
impacted upon them: poor quality education, high unemployment, expanding poverty, 
widening income gaps, deteriorating public services, political oppression and social 
neglect.  
 
Since the 1990s the Tunisian regime, under President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali,  had 
positioned the country as among the  global leaders in developing  youth policies to 
supposedly address the very issues that youth were to protest about in 2010, adopting 
and reproducing the positive development approach espoused by key international 
partners and institutions. The Uprising was  indicative that such polices had 
substantively  failed, raising questions about the objectives and efficacy of the formats 
applied. 
 
This paper seeks to add  to evolving debates over the contribution that a political 
economy approach can make to understanding the current condition of youth, 
specifically narrowing the focus to youth policy. This paper suggests a political 
economy approach which locates youth not as a class in itself but as being 
increasingly but not universally located at the epicentre of the growing global labour 
precariat. Young people are differentially vulnerable to this status, their identities 
being inter-sected variously by race, gender, locale, ethnicity and all manner of other 
identities, as well as by the particularities of the political ecology in which they find 
themselves. But by virtue of their late-comer status to the labour market at a time 
when older cohorts are struggling to maintain the privileges previously accorded them 
by welfarist industrial state models, as well as their very restricted access to networks 
and structures of political power, they have limited capacity as a collective to resist 
the new formats for work and labour relations.  
 
In this context, the political structures and institutions which promote the interests of 
neo-liberal capital construct narratives of youth which segregate them from older 
cohorts, disrupting the potential for broader class consciousness, legitimising the 
subordination of young people to political control, and casting resistance as a threat to 
the collective interest. Youth policy becomes the vehicle for establishing segregation 
and  control, as well as a means of distracting attention from the deeper structural 
failings of national economies and the political regimes which rule them.  
 
By examining youth policy under President Ben Ali, imbued as it was with the  
positive development approach espoused by international partners such as the EU, the 
paper argues that it served both discursively and operationally as an instrument of 
neo-liberal economic change in the context of globalising capital. However, Tunisian 
youth policy was simultaneously fraught with contradictions created by local 
authoritarian political structures, intent on subverting the economy to their own self-
enrichment, and reinforcing their own structural power. Interrogating national youth 
policy in Tunisia thus extends our understanding of what drives youth policy, and 
determines its outcomes, showing that a political economy approach can help us to  
understand the  impact of the multiple global and local  structures and hierarchies of 
power  which frame it  and ultimately determine its efficacy. The interests represented 
in these hierarchies can create contradictions which may not only obstruct the 
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anticipated outcomes of policy, but actually divert policy instruments to service 
entirely different agendas at the expense of  youth. Moreover, policies which 
distinguish youth as a target category for supposedly progressive intervention may in 
reality be instruments for the subordination of entire populations. 
 
 
Towards a new political economy of youth policy 
 
Youth policy can be understood as having lain, till now, largely within the 
disciplinary domain of social policy, building on a long tradition of work in 
sociology, psychology and criminology. Until recently political economy made only a 
limited contribution:  Marxist and radical critiques in the late 1960s  focused on youth 
activism as illustrations of resistance to the pressures of industrial capital. In 1968, 
Rowntree and Rowntree (1968) famously argued that young people constituted  a 
particular form of socially, economically and politically disenfranchised class. Later 
research included contextual considerations of gender and race when it became clear 
that ‘youth as class’ obscured the differential experiences of youth attributable to 
vertically-stratifying social categories, while ‘underclass theory’ suggests youth have 
their own class culture distinct from that of the working classes (MacDonald, 1997).  
But debate then moved away from political economy and youth studies was 
dominated by sociological discussion which paid attention to youth as a process or 
relational concept, a period of transition between childhood and adulthood, a 
constructed social category whose meanings and identities are derived from context 
and environment, and which constitutes a process of navigation towards markers that 
line the route towards, and demarcate achievement of, the status of adult. 
Undoubtedly such discussion moves us well beyond the deficit approach (Cooper, 
2009: p.XX) to ‘youth as problem’, notions of ‘storm and stress’ (Hall, 1904), youth 
as a response to modernity or a focus on ‘delinquency’ and ‘deviance’ studies  
(Merton, 1938). But while such approaches emphasise sources of exclusion (whether 
due to the deficits within youth themselves or within the environments which they 
inhabit), they have less to say about (policy) pathways to inclusion other than those 
that are  regulatory, sanctionary, ameliorating, or revolutionary. Moreover, as  Côté 
argues (2013: 527), they direct attention to only the most disadvantaged among youth, 
rather than the youth category as whole, and have been “preoccupied with 
subjectivities rather than material conditions”.  
 
Côté himself made a potent plea for a return to a political economy approach in light 
of accumulating evidence that youth as a social category have become substantively 
proletarianised in the wake of decades of neo-liberalism and a global crisis of 
capitalism which has manifested itself in disproportionate rates of youth 
unemployment, precarious living and lost futures.  
 
Liberal youth studies research has, he argues, inadvertently endorsed corporate 
capitalist exploitation of youth-as-class by failing to question who or what has caused 
the trends they describe and by accepting the status quo as ‘something that can be 
fixed by changing the young person into “an adult”’ (Côté , 2013: 538). For Côté,  a 
political economy approach “can be defined as a perspective that investigates the root 
causes and consequences of positioning over time of the youth segment in relation to 
those (adults) in a  given society with political and economic power”. Drawing for 
evidence on sociological work not normally presented as political economy, he 
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suggests that youth can be understood as  an economically exploited group, politically 
unrepresented and “part of a progressive disenfranchisement and proletarianisation” 
associated with global liberal capitalism.  
 
In coming late to the labour market and with little access to established networks of 
power, young people are the most vulnerable to capitalism’s insatiable drive to lower 
wages, leading to a progressive deterioration in their material wealth and a growing 
redistribution of wealth (and power) between age cohorts or generations. Narratives of 
‘youth as problem’ – and  youth policies designed to address ‘the problem’ - evolve to  
ideologically justify both these differentials in wealth and the political suppression of 
efforts to protest them. Finally cohort awareness of the material and generational 
differentials evolves, much akin to, if not actually constructing,  class consciousness. 
Thus Côté  heralds the return  of youth-as-class, albeit not un-problematically.  
 
This approach foregrounds  the causes and processes of social conflict:  Côté refers to 
the “‘conquest of youth’ by corporations and governments in stifling dissent and 
orchestrating social control of youth…….as having neutralised recent cohorts of 
youth as a political threat to the hegemony of capitalist ideologies” (Côté, 2013: 528). 
In short, those with power devise policies towards or impacting upon the young with 
the intent of consolidating their subordination, including for example the production 
of consumption-based youth cultures which either manufacture consent or reduce 
resistance to spectacular performances. Recognising this provides pathways to 
resistance which go well beyond the minor reforms in fields such as education and 
training which are the focus of liberal youth studies.  
 
Côté’s political economy approach is not uncontested. In a rejoinder to his original 
article France and Threadgold (2016) argue that “Ever-increasing inequalities within 
the so-called youth class make youth-as-class unlikely” (p. 616). Indeed, as a social 
category which encompasses individuals from across income groups, youth-as-class 
can actually disguise other structural inequalities exacerbated by capitalism. Race, 
sect, gender and what are more conventionally considered as  income-based socio-
economic class differentials, can be obscured by its homogenising discourse. 
Moreover France and Threadgold argue that the blurred boundaries between the 
concepts of youth and adulthood and the un-fixed status of both, make class formation 
improbable, and that the notions of manufactured consent and false consciousness 
among the young simply replicate the moral panic behind the youth-as-problem frame 
and occlude very real evidence of youth agency. While they agree that a political 
economy perspective “remains vital for understanding macro-structural power” (619), 
they propose that understanding the differential experiences of the youth cohort – the 
inequalities between them rather than the material distribution of wealth between age 
cohorts, can be best understood through the concept of political ecology, the 
interrelationship between the social and economic environment within which a young 
person finds her/himself and the political ideas and institutional practices which 
structure it.  
 
“We need to recognise not only the important role that politics has on 
structuring and forming the world around the young, but also how 
relationships of power and access to resources operate in particular 
contexts to produce unequal outcomes” (621). 
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The dialogue between Côté and his critiques raised the importance of recognising 
both the commonalities of the positioning of younger cohorts in the global liberal 
capitalist political economy, and at the same time the differences between them which 
may inhibit a substantive form of class consolidation. To accommodate the breadth 
and complexity of local settings, the totality of social relations, and long-term patterns 
of change, Sukarieh and Tannock (2016) therefore suggest that a broader definition of 
political economy be used, citing that of The Political Economy Project (2016) which: 
 
Addresses the mutual constitution of states, markets, and classes; the co-
constitution of class race, gender, and other forms of identity; varying 
modes of capital accumulation and the legal, political, and cultural forms 
of their regulation; relations among local, national, and global forms of 
capital, class, and culture; the construction of forms of knowledge and 
hegemony; techno-politics; water and the environment as resources and 
fields of contestation; the role of war in the constitution of states and 
classes; and practices and cultures of domination and resistance”. 
 
This definition may be so all-encompassing as to be virtually impossible to actually 
apply, but it does foreground the totality of the political ecology, with all its 
multifarious actors, agents, dynamics and constraints, contributing to a route map by 
which we might deploy  a political economy approach to studying youth policy in a 
specific context. 
 
Firstly, it suggests that young people may usefully be thought of as a cohort located at 
the epicentre of a larger structural transformation, and specifically new forms of 
precarious proletarianisation, in the global liberal capitalist system. By virtue of their 
late-comer status and their lack of political power, young people are simply the most 
vulnerable in society as capital seeks to extract ever more surplus value from labour 
and to diminish the costly welfarist obligations which were imposed upon it, and 
enjoyed, by previous age cohorts. Young people do not exclusively constitute a class, 
but they are disproportionately represented within what Standing has termed  the new 
‘precariat’ (Standing, 2011). They are collectively but not universally at the heart of a 
socio-economic class which exists relative to capital. Thus the condition and 
structures which support neo-liberal capital within a given context are crucial to 
understanding the location and status of youth and youth policy. 
 
Secondly, since youth as a social category is increasingly socially and politically 
constructed around their relationship with capital, hegemonic narratives of youth are 
formulated and reproduced which view them principally as human resources, as 
potentially  embodying the skills and capacities which can be mobilised for national 
economic growth, or alternatively as costly recipients of public support dependent on 
their employment status. Exploring the hegemonic narratives of youth and the 
political and social structures which reproduce them becomes key to the study, 
 
Thirdly, these  narratives are embedded within the political institutions and structures 
which service the reproduction of capital.  Liberal  capitalism is  secured, protected 
and advanced by political structures which operate at both systemic (global) and local 
(national) levels. The precise configurations of these structures may be historically, 
geographically, economically and even culturally specific, suggesting that the precise  
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nature of both the social and political constructions of youth on the one hand, and 
their integration into the global political economy on the other, will be variable and 
case-dependent. For countries beyond the post-industrial core, much will depend on 
how local political structures interact with and map onto global political structures 
and hierarchies of power as well as the location of national economies within global 
divisions of labour and distributions of capital. The analysis needs thus to extend to 
the location of the national within the global political economy.  
 
Youth Policy in the liberal capitalist economy 
This would all suggest that youth policy becomes a vehicle through which the 
political structures which sustain liberal capitalism seek to mobilise youth as a factor 
of production whilst controlling young people’s capacity to resist or assert alternative 
identities. By distinguishing youth from older cohorts, youth-specific policies serve to 
disrupt processes of class formation and consolidation, to fragment class identities and 
to ferment conflict between generational cohorts within the new precariat. 
Sukarieh and Tannock (2014: p.19) were making much the same argument in their 
discussion of  the positive development approach (PDA)  to youth which underpins 
much of what is touted as the  ‘gold standard’ for youth policy, arguing that it 
“represents a shift in dominant conceptualisations of youth that has been driven, in 
large part, by neoliberal ideology and human capital theory”. The positive 
development approach (PDA) which originated among community organisations in 
the USA in the late twentieth century, claimed to  empower young people to over-
come the obstacles to their own exclusion (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2014: p.17).  
Governments and international agencies, notably the European Union but including 
bodies such as the World Bank and the United Nations, began to structure policies 
around recognition of the unique capacities and potential contributions of youth, 
aiming to  nurture their contributions in the fields of entrepreneurship, political 
activism, civic engagement, and social leadership. Youth policy was extended to a 
wide range of inter-connected policy arenas such as  education (both formal and non-
formal),  access to new technologies; information and career guidance, mobility, 
justice and youth rights; participation and active citizenship; recreation and leisure 
activities, international opportunities and a safe and secure environment. (Denstad, 
2009). The objective was to facilitate the development of skills and competencies, a 
key premise being “that once these competencies have been identified and conditions 
created, all youth are capable of healthy or positive development” (Sukarieh and 
Tannock, 2014:  p.18).   
 
Coussée, Roets and De Bie (2009: p.425) have pointed out that employment is at the 
heart of the PDA. The approach rejects notions of adolescents as wilfully reluctant to 
engage in the responsibilities and commitments of work as they explore and develop 
their own adult identities, viewing them rather as resourceful and resilient workers 
when offered the opportunity of meaningful employment. As well as constructing an 
identity for youth based on their potential to contribute to the (capitalist) world of 
work, the notion that young people – if properly nurtured – can become independent 
contributors to society effectively undermines welfarist visions of collective 
responsibility. If young people are not after all necessarily vulnerable as a result of 
their immaturity, they do not need generalised state-delivered support and protection 
and can be expected to prove “capable of bearing life’s burdens without breaking” 
(Damon, 2004: p.15).  
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Accordingly, the  PDA focuses on education and training as the primary vehicle for 
youth policy. “In recent times, education (and ‘training’) policy has been formulated 
on the basis of an economic rationalist agenda in which young people are only of 
value as an investment in the future and as workers of [the] restructured 
economy…They have come to be seen as the bearers of skills which will be 
capitalised on in the future” ((Wyn and White, 1997: 7). As Standing puts it: “The 
neo-liberal state has been transforming school systems to make them a consistent part 
of the market society, pushing education in the direction of ‘human capital formation’ 
and job preparation.” (Standing, 2011: 68).  
 
But the neo-liberal economy is not friendly to youth once they achieve this education. 
It has entailed the abandonment of restrictions on the working hours and conditions of 
young people, downwards pressure on their wages to the point where they can often 
ill-afford economic independence from their parents (Blanchflower, 1999a, 1999b).  
and the removal of social security and income support infrastructure. At the same 
time, competition for the relatively few jobs at the pinnacle of the knowledge 
economy has forced the prolongation of the educational phase and a qualification 
inflation which forces many young people to settle for lower-tier lower-paid jobs than 
they are educated for. All this has fundamentally transformed the connection of young 
people to the labour market and placed more responsibilities upon families to give 
economic support to young people undertaking ever more extended transitions” 
(Coles, 1995: p.56). Continued material dependence on the family contrasts sharply 
with  the developing personal autonomy of young people, especially as the 
possibilities for communicating and socialising beyond local communities  are 
expanded by education, ICTs and new forms of mobility. Inter-generational 
differences are reinforced as young people are forced by their parents’ deferred 
retirements into informal economies or migration in order to find work in employment 
patterns deeply unfamiliar to their parents’ generation. At the same time, increased 
reliance on familial and social networks rather than public services and/or regular 
employment  reinforces pre-existing disparities among youth in terms of access to 
social, economic and political power. Woodman and Wyn (2014) suggest that the 
inequalities arising from class, gender, ethnic and other social differentiations are not 
simply reinforced by neo-liberalism but rather restructured and reproduced in new 
ways, and that youth suffer disproportionately and very specifically from these 
changes, albeit differently in different 'North' and 'South', national and local contexts. 
They speak of “local, and increasingly global, transition regimes, based on 
institutionally sanctioned trajectories through education into labour markets, [which] 
create normative youth transitions, yet the neo-liberal promise of the benefits of 
global economic development has emerged for a minority only, creating new forms of 
inequality in and across national boundaries" (p.166).  
 
Youth policy, from this perspective, is the institutional vehicle through which 
transition regimes prepare and direct young people into the least secure corners of the 
neo-liberal employment market. Undoubtedly the normative framework or ideological 
justification which provides the logic of ‘youth policy’ comes from the governments 
and institutions of the Global North -  the highest layer of the particular structures and 
hierarchies of  power determined by neo-liberal capitalism. The EU has been foremost 
among such institutions, promoting its PDA-based approach through instruments such 
as  the White Paper on Youth in 2001, (revised in 2010 as An EU Strategy for Youth: 
Investing  and Empowering’), a  European Youth Pact devised in 2005, a 2007-2013 
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Youth in Action Programme, the 2007 Structured Dialogue, the 2008 Renewed Social 
Agenda and the Youth Partnership (Denstad, F: 2009, pp.21-39). What is notable 
about all these initiatives is their promotion of a PDA to youth policy, not only within 
the EU but within aspiring EU members and  Mediterranean partner states such as 
Tunisia. An unequal partnership has been used to export the policy frames of the 
global North to the liberalising economies of the South. 
 
But how transferable are such universal policy propositions? It is important to note 
that the  PDA  to youth policy is built upon an ideal of the modern market society 
nurtured in the most developed, largely liberal or social democratic countries of the 
North and reproduced through the youth policy agendas of the largest and most 
powerful actors in the global political economy. The universalising dimension of  the 
PDA  to youth policy renders variations in political structures at local levels less 
visible. It assumes that youth policy models can be exported despite very different 
political environments precisely because they focus on developing the individual 
rather than the public context. Despite the social construction of youth in any given 
geography being still shaped in large part by meanings derived from local social and 
political processes and institutions, these are considered less relevant to policy, in turn 
allowing the political structures which comprise perhaps the key component of the 
local political ecology in which young people find themselves to fade from view. 
Ironically, however, the task of narrating, justifying, formulating and implementing 
the specifics of youth policy depend in any given context on local political institutions 
and structures, so any assessment of youth policy is duty-bound to bring the local 
political economy ‘back in’. 
 
Youth policy in Tunisia through a political economy lens 
The examination offered here, of Tunisian youth policy under President Ben Ali 
attempts to do just this. It not only recognises the impact of authoritarian political rule 
on the construction of youth in Tunisia, and the policy architecture established to 
harness its multiple potentials, but also the international structural context which 
provided both discursive and operational cover for the regime in its efforts to contain 
them. The objective here is to offer a multi-layered political economy of youth policy 
which acknowledges both local and global structures and hierarchies of power around 
the neo-liberal economy.  
 
This comes with a health warning, however. Building on radical rather than liberal 
trends in critical thinking foregrounds structure at the expense of agency and risks 
reducing very real and meaningful strategies and actions of resistance to futile 
gestures in the face of over-whelming structural power. There is insufficient space 
here to elaborate on formats for youth-based class resistance throughout the Ben Ali 
years, such as the Gafsa riots in 2008, social media activism or the growth of popular 
protest music cultures. However, the analysis does suggest  an understanding of the 
Uprising in 2010/11 – which was youth-led but not youth-exclusive – as an act of 
mass resistance to the particular politically-structured manifestation of neo-liberal 
capitalism in Tunisia in which authoritarian cronyism distorted the progress of 
economic liberalisation even as it subordinated Tunisian youth to it. That should not 
be read as reducing the Uprising to simple class warfare but rather as explaining how 
the positioning of youth within the totality of the local ecology might have led to this 
particular outcome.  As Côté points out, political economy cannot offer a grand theory 
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for understanding contemporary youth (2013: p.41), or youth policy, but it can 
provide a potent critique of the current direction of travel.  
 
Tunisia: The (local) authoritarian neo-liberal context 
The departure point for analysing youth policy under Ben Ali must be the particular 
configurations of structural power, both locally and in terms of how Tunisia was 
integrated into the global political economy. 
 
Tunisia became independent in 1956, progressing from a corporatist model of single-
party rule under its first President Habib Bourguiba, into a distinctly authoritarian 
political system under President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali (Murphy, 1999). The regime 
relied on formal and informal coercive and neo-patrimonial institutions and networks, 
which concentrated power in the hands of a small urban, regionally-focused, 
internationally-connected political elite clustered within a first single, later dominant, 
ruling party (the PSD, renamed RCD), backed by a core of security-service personnel 
and over time coming to orbit the extended family of the President himself.  
 
After a short-lived socialist experiment, Bourguiba pursued a mixed-economy 
approach to development which privileged the public sector but never sought to purge 
the private sector. Under his rule, the state developed its own empire of production, 
regulation and employment, economic and political activity became geographically 
concentrated in Tunis and along the coastal sahel, and civic life existed only within 
the nationalist vehicle (Parti Socialiste Destourienne) or carefully regulated 
corporatist associations.   
 
Prolonged economic crises, compounded by growing militant Islamism and  
Bourguiba’s own deteriorating political acuity, led to Ben Ali seizing power in a 
constitutional coup in 1987. He set Tunisia on a course of profound structural 
adjustment, enmeshing Tunisia in the neo-liberal financial structures of IFIs, and  
adjusting national political discourses to accommodate the transformation to an 
export-oriented market economy driven by private sector investment. In order to 
overcome resistance from within the ruling single-party, he initiated a pseudo-
democratic liberalisation process, legalising selected opposition parties and 
overseeing weighted electoral processes which reduced them to the status of loyal 
opposition. Genuine opposition, from either the communist left or the Islamist right, 
was forcibly excluded from politics under a harsh regime of surveillance, human 
rights abuses, detentions, and exile. The regime staged democratic performances 
through party reform, national elections, manipulation of the media and international 
engagements, largely driven by the desire to integrate Tunisia into the European and 
Atlantic economic and security architectures. The process itself was widely applauded 
by both the IFIs and the EU (with which Tunisia was the first southern Mediterranean 
country to sign a Partnership Agreement in 1995). A  succession of five year 
development plans which successively sought to achieve macro-economic stability, 
curtail budget deficits, initiate public sector, financial and trade reforms, encourage 
FDI, accelerate privatisation, develop the local stock market, deepen integration with 
global markets, upgrade the competitiveness of local firms, and introduce technology 
innovation produced sufficiently positive indicators that the IMF noted in 2007 that: 
“Effective economic management has helped achieve relatively strong growth while 
preserving macro-economic stability, hereby positioning Tunisia among the leading 
economic performers in the region” (IMF, 2007).  
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Partnership with Europe was predicated on a Tunisian commitment to a liberal 
economic transformation. The Barcelona Process which under-pinned it aimed at 
creating an intra-regional industrial free-trade area on a hub-and-spoke model, with 
southern Partners opening their markets, upgrading their own private sectors (with 
financial and technical support from Europe), and implementing the  
fiscal and regulatory reforms which would enable both. In fact, and despite the overall 
growth in Tunisian exports and investment, the terms of the Partnership Agreement 
itself led to a continuing and massively disproportionate Tunisian reliance on Europe 
for markets, imports, FDI and tourism remittances. Despite reciprocal commitments 
in the Partnership Agreement to supporting human rights and a flourishing civil 
society (Xenakis and Chryssochoou, 2001: pp.75-6), the European Union turned a 
blind eye to Ben Ali’s authoritarianism, placing greater weight on the economic 
basket  and on shared security concerns over Islamist terrorism, illegal immigration 
and drug trafficking across the Mediterranean.  
 
Beyond the carefully constructed positive macro-economic indicators, the reality was 
grim. The  absence of political accountability, the power of the family-based regime 
to act as gate-keepers over the domestic economy through process of removing state 
regulation and ownership, and the simultaneous possibilities presented by flows of 
international finance, undermined the outcomes of the structural adjustment process. 
The distortions created by authoritarian rule were largely hidden from view through 
careful manipulation of the statistical data offered to international partners, tight 
control of domestic media and the forceful repression of dissenting voices (Murphy, 
2013: pp 35-57). Far from facilitating a re-invigorated and vibrant private sector, the 
extensive corruption and lack of transparency deterred all but the most cynical of 
foreign investors. These last colluded with the family and  allies of Ben Ali, to create 
low added-value jobs in industrial plants which were sub-contracted to European 
producers or serviced European tourists. Domestic private industry was squeezed not 
only by an incompetent and overly-complex bureaucracy, but also by foreign 
competitors with privileged access to licenses that supplied rent to the regime cronies. 
The President,  his family and their cronies used their political leverage to capture 
privatisations at below-market prices, to cut competitors out of the market, to 
appropriate the financial support of IFIs, to gain cheap unsecured loans from the 
banks, to bully their way into lucrative directorships and share-options, and to simply 
seize assets as they chose. The loosening of financial regulations allowed them to 
transfer much of their new found wealth out of the country. In effect, the result of 
neo-liberal reform under authoritarianism was that the private sector did not grow to 
fill the space of a diminished public sector but rather that a new deviant hybrid third 
sector arose. It occupied as much as a third of the entire economy which experienced 
widening poverty, profound structural unemployment, corrosive corruption, and 
ultimately political and economic crisis.   
 
The political economy of Ben Ali’s Tunisia was built around a particular set of 
structural hierarchies of power. The regime elites were incorporated into a Euro-
global capitalist class, although they were on the margins of network power in that  
they extracted rent from the circulation of capital (into and out of Tunisia) rather than 
being at its productive heart. Where they were engaged in productive activity, this 
remained ultimately extractive and had little or no investment focus for long term 
growth. The regime reproduced the discourses and instruments of the IFIs, the EU, the 
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USA, and to a lesser extent the United Nations, both to legitimise itself at home and to 
embed itself within the global neo-liberal hierarchy. But these discourses and the 
performances they entailed, masked the reality that the regime depended on its 
coercive control over the political apparatus and wider society in order to sustain its 
own  survival and enrichment. Outbreaks of unrest in the regions most severely 
impacted by unemployment and disinvestment (such as Gafsa in 2008) were brutally 
repressed and hidden behind media censorship. The language of universal inclusion 
based on widening opportunities for political representation and national growth 
grotesquely obscured a reality of deepening authoritarianism and the private looting 
of the national economy.  
 
Youth policy under Ben Ali 
For Ben Ali, the need to reorient the economy towards private sector-driven growth 
came at an awkward time in demographic terms. The population had grown  rapidly 
after independence as a result of economic growth, falling infant mortality, and  
Bourguiba’s own nominally progressive social agenda ( including state feminism, , 
universal education, the and the availability of family planning). The total population 
grew from 6.3 million in 1980 to 10.6 million in 2010, although the actual growth rate 
declined from 2.61% in 1980-85 to 1.12% in 2005-10).  
 
By 2011, Tunisia was exhibiting a very significant youth bulge, the largest sections of 
the population falling between the ages of 15 and 35. Although youth  (measured as 
being between 15-24 years old) was  falling as a percentage of the working population 
from 39.2% in 1980 to 27.1% in 2010 (United Nations, 2012), the consequences of 
the earlier growth meant that Tunisia was briefly enjoying  falling dependency ratios 
which should have translated into a thriving economic environment.  
 
In fact, the opposite was true. The progressive  failure to grow the economy 
sufficiently fast to absorb new entrants to the labour market meant that youth 
unemployment (for 15-24 year olds) was officially 31% of the male labour force and 
29 of the female labour force by 2010 (and unofficially, and regionally, very much 
higher). In September 2008 the Consultation nationale sur l’emploi published a 
report, later mysteriously to disappear from official sources, indicating that young 
people (below 29 years of age) represented around 80% of all unemployed (CNE, 
referred to in Paciello et al, p. 12).   
 
‘Stalled transition’ had become  a primary feature of Tunisian life (Paciella, Pepicelli 
and Pioppi, 2015: 6). The absence of opportunities for so many young people to be 
materially independent, to marry and have children, or to express their own political 
and civic preferences under  progressively worsening authoritarianism, meant that 
Tunisia was the example, par excellence, of a  generalised MENA generational 
narrative of  youth exclusion (Murphy, 2012: Pacella, Pepicelli and Pioppi, 2015: 
p.7).  
 
The Ben Ali regime was not unaware of the destabilising potential of so many 
disappointed young people and Tunisia was among the first Arab states to try and 
address youth directly as a social category for policy purposes. Until then, youth had 
barely featured distinctively in policy beyond education. A Ministry of Youth and 
Sport (MYS)  had existed since independence but a separate Ministry of Education 
and (from 1992) and Ministry of Women and Family Affairs, meant that the MYS 
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confined its activities to sport and ring-fenced projects such as international 
exchanges, orphanages and support for scouting organisations. The Union general des 
éudiants de Tunisia (UGET), existed principally as a mobilisatory vehicle for the 
ruling party (initially the PSD, then latterly the RCD). Beyond that, there was little by 
way of recognition of youth in national policy. 
 
In 1995, however, the Conseil National de la Jeunesse (National Council of Youth) 
was established to engage youth in the preparation of a  National Youth Strategy. In 
2002 the Observatoire National de la Jeunesse  was also established to conduct 
research on youth which would inform national development plans. The subsequent 
approach to youth policy-making  had a number of distinct features.  
 
Youth as human resource 
Firstly, and as could be expected from Ben Ali’s commitment to the neo-liberal 
economic project,  the category of youth was constructed first and foremost as one of 
human resource. Unable to reconcile rising (youth) unemployment with its master 
narrative of economic success through liberalisation, the regime relied on a somewhat 
contradictory strategy. On the one hand, it sought to emphasise the specific problems 
associated with a demographic bulge (making less visible the problems of generalised 
structural unemployment); on the other it consistently massaged the figures to suggest 
that unemployment was lower than it actually was (Hibou, 2006) , not least by 
ignoring the growing reliance of young people on partial or informal employment. 
(By 2012/13, 34.2 of men aged 15-29 and 46.0 of women were in vulnerable, casual 
or temporary employment, while 37.4% of men and 31.8% of women aged 15-19 
were unemployed (ILO, 2015: pp.91 and 93).  
 
Youth employment policy, (which identified youth as within the 15-29 years age 
bracket)  followed a twin track approach. Firstly youth were encouraged into 
employment through training programmes and professional internships, targeting 
primarily the pool of graduate labour. Paciella, Pepicelli and Pioppi list the 
progression of internship programmes starting in 1987 with the Stages d’initiation à 
la vie professionnelle/SIVP), and followed with the SIVP2 in 1993, the Prise en 
charge par l’Etat de 50 purcent des salaires verses (PC50) in 2004,  the Labour 
Market access and Employability programme (CAIP), the Voluntary Civil Service 
(SCV), the Employment Program for Graduates of Higher Education (CIDES) and the 
Youth back-to-work Program after 2009, all of which “exacerbate precariousness and 
insecurity among youth” (p.11) . Although the Tunisian government invested 
significant sums in these Active Labour Market Programs (ALMPs), a World Bank 
report based on extensive survey work and published in 2014, showed that relatively 
few Tunisian youth were familiar with them, they had low rates of participation 
(especially among non-graduates), and they were considered to be little more than a 
'sham' - providing firms with cheap subsidised labour, accessible only to those with 
connections, offering a poor quality of training and unlikely to lead to subsequent 
employment (World Bank, 2014: pp.62-64), a criticism also levelled at the  National 
Employment Fund, which provided salary support for young graduates recruited  by 
associations.  A number of entrepreneurship programs were also initiated by the 
National Agency for Employment and Independent Work (ANETI), offering 
microfinance loans through The Fonds National de Promotion del;'Artisanat et des 
Petits Metiers (FONAPRA add in accent) or the Fonds National de Solidarite (FNS - 
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add in accept). Again, the World Bank found that both awareness and take-up of these 
programs was low. 
 
Overall, and in terms of the liberal economic logic behind their construction, both the 
ALMPs and the enterprise programs were overly-centralised, inhibiting innovation 
and local adaptation, and were poorly structured and managed causing duplication, 
ineffective provision, no local ownership, and low levels of trust among youth. They 
suffered from the reluctance of the regime to genuinely engage the private sector as 
full-partners but rather to deploy it as a captive partner in a collusionary game. The 
importance of personal contacts or RCD party membership in accessing schemes 
(Honwana, 2011: p.12)  - whether real or perceived - was indicative of the trickle-
down impact of patrimonial politics and  corruption more broadly (Wikileaks, 2008) 
and in no way did the various programs address the profound structural distortions 
behind unemployment. In fact, only 25% of all unemployed took advantage of any 
ALMPs, making the 1% of GDP what was spent on them both inequitable and largely 
ineffective (Achy, 2011: p.11). 
 
Ben Ali’s youth policies replicated the discourses and objectives of the EU’s PDA. 
They served to disrupt representations of the reality of an overall structural incapacity 
to create demand for labour, casting the problem of deep structural unemployment as 
being largely specific to youth and passing the responsibility for its resolution onto 
young people themselves by offering a variety of ALMs for which young people had 
to compete with one  another and subordinate themselves to (formal and informal)  
hegemonic political institutions. Those same local political structures themselves 
impeded the growth of the  private domestic productive economy fully-integrated into 
the global political economy, upon which this supply-side approach to the labour 
market was predicated. Even the exploitative precarious work which integration into 
the global economy could bring was restricted, while the capacity of policy initiatives 
to feed young people into such work was very low. With older workers busy 
defending their relative privileges positions in the labour force (and directing trade 
unions activity thus), and a youth policy discourse which identified youth as the 
determining characteristic of poor employability, the overall long-term transformation 
of the Tunisian labour market to the detriment of labour was effectively disguised and 
class consolidation disrupted. 
 
 
Constructing a narrative of Youth 
At a political economy approach would predict, Ben Ali’s regime was at pains to 
develop a national discourse on youth which justified the propositions of his youth 
policy. The political construction drew from broader relational constructions of the 
family so as to resonate with society as a whole. The two key features of this 
construct were the role of the President himself as a father-like champion of youth and 
the representation of youth as alternatively good and obedient family/nation members 
or troublesome deviant outcasts. Youth were portrayed as  ‘virtuous citizens and hope 
of the nation’ on the one hand, or ‘youth as problem and threat to the nation’ on the 
other. 
 
Ben Ali located youth directly in relation to his own rule, proclaiming himself to be  
the champion of youth and personally responsible for enabling them to take their 
rightful place in the national project by offering varied opportunities for political and 
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social representation. Policy initiatives were fronted by the President, often  in media 
spectacles, as with the Presidential Youth Programme of the 11
th
 Development Plan 
2007-11 or the 2010 International Symposium on “Youth and the Future”. In doing 
so, he claimed the position of authoritative father-figure, reducing young people to a 
position of obedience and subordination. His policy  initiatives deployed symbolic 
and discursive tools which offered inclusion to those ‘responsible’ young citizens, 
who were hailed as "being at the forefront of the forces of progress embracing noble 
universal values" (Morjane, 2010: p.3). 
 
There was nothing new in this: the ruling party had since independence sought to 
engage youth as citizens in the national project.  The MYS had established over 300 
Youth Centres across the country which had promoted citizenship and the integration 
of youth into society. Largely under-funded, these were considered by most young 
people to be  useful only for sports and latterly internet access facilities. In 1971 the 
Tunisian Union of Youth Organisations was established as an independent association 
of youth organisations and was represented on the  Higher Youth Council - a body 
elected by associations and acting as  a government forum on youth matters but 
largely ineffective.  
 
As the regime came under increasing pressure from the competing appeal of political 
Islamism in the 1980s,  and then worsening unemployment from the 1990s, it stepped 
up its efforts to buy youthful compliance through direct political engagement. 1988 
was proclaimed a  “Year of Dialogue with Youth”. In 1996 a “First Youth 
Consultation” was held under the theme 'Tunisia listens to its youth”. A second Youth 
Consultation was held in 2000, with the theme “Youth, Dialogue and Participation in 
decision-making” and a third in 2005 was themed on “Youth preparing for a 
promising future”. 2008 was proclaimed to be a “Year of Comprehensive Dialogue 
with the Youth”, with the associative engagement feeding into a National Youth Pact 
(reportedly signed by 1.3 million Tunisian youths) and a National Strategy for Youth 
Policy for the period 2009-2014. To incentivise political  participation, the voting age 
was lowered from 20 to 18 , the minimum age for standing for parliament was 
lowered from 28 to 23, and the political parties were encouraged to increase the 
representation of youth in their higher committees.  
 
The  paternalistic discourse which overlay all these initiatives suggested that youth 
had to be guided into responsible participation by wiser heads and that they should 
assume responsibility for their problems rather than looking to the state to resolve 
them, echoing the underlying ethos of the positive development approach:.   
 
“It is [also] necessary to imbue our youth with the culture of diligence and self-
reliance, and with the sense of transcendence on overcoming difficulties and 
obstacles they face in their life. Attention should be focused on the vital sectors 
that target youth directly, such as health, education, training, culture, 
communications technologies, employment, social care, leisure and sports 
activities, volunteerism and civil society action. Wisdom dictates that in all 
these sectors, we should offer youth all the conditions that ensure a sound 
educational, intellectual and physical upbringing, and prepare them to be an 
inspiring force of action in their societies, to assume their sense of responsibility 
in terms of decision-making in their countries and to positively influence their 
time” (Short, 2010).. 
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Ben Ali spoke of the importance of youth in representing the symbolic values of 
“freedom, equality, justice, dialogue, tolerance, democracy and human rights” – all 
virtues which the state claimed for itself regardless of the authoritarian political reality 
and in antithesis to militant political Islam. Here was the  dark side of this discourse;  
the suggestion that youth were vulnerable to alternative, violent and disruptive 
behaviours associated with those political groups which challenged the regime itself. 
Ben Ali warned in the same speech about the “propagating trends of extremism” and 
in his final speech before fleeing the country in 2011 he spoke of the demonstrations 
as being led by “delinquents”  who had fallen foul of youthful naivete and deviation 
from the path of rightful and patriotic behaviour (YouTube, 2011). He repeatedly 
spoke of the importance of decisions taken for youth on their behalf, of efforts to 
prompt them into action for their own good, and of the responsibility of their elders 
for them.  
 
The notion that the state had a parenting role in protecting youth from harmful 
influences, instructing them in their citizenship, was not unique to Tunisia among 
Arab states (Swedenburg, 2007), finding resonance in deeper authoritarian modes of 
parental and social control (UNDP, 2003, p.22). He also found receptive audiences for 
this projection of a deficit approach to youth among Western allies concerned about 
the rising tide of political Islam. Through this discourse both   the Tunisian population 
and its international allies were offered a securitised choice between working with  a 
neo-liberal,  internationally co-operative Tunisian government which valued and 
nurtured its youth on the one hand, and a descent into violent, economically 
incoherent and Islamist-fermented chaos on the other. This discourse was ultimately 
used to defend the regime from the demonstrations in 2011.  In his final speech Ben 
Ali stated: 
 
“To those who deliberately harm the interests of the country, abuse the 
credibility of our youth and that of our daughters and sons in schools or colleges 
or incite unrest and agitation, we say quite clearly that the law will have the last 
word…..We urge parents and all citizens to protect their children from these 
agitators and these criminals to take better care of themselves and be aware of 
the risks to be instrumented and operated by such extremist groups” (Ben Ali, 
2011). 
 
Not surprisingly the various government initiatives and the organisations designed to 
incorporate youth were considered by most Tunisians to be nothing more than off-
shoots of the regime itself, with membership and participation depending on RCD 
affiliation. Youth Information Points (run through the Youth Centres network),  
Youth-oriented TV and radio stations, and a national youth website, were all 
perceived as instruments for regime propaganda.. Independent youth organisations 
found their activities closely monitored and were subsequently clustered in the arts, 
sports, cultural and voluntary sectors rather than politics. An EU-funded study 
produced in 2009 that just 0.5% of young people were engaged in associative activity 
(Floris, 2009, p.8), that youth leaders were considered poorly trained, and that young 
people ‘”were afraid of long-term, weekly, regular participation” in associations.  
Although official dialogue spaces  were multiplied, the authoritarian nature of rule 
meant that youth citizenship was equated with compliance with the regime's own 
political survival project.. 
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The construction of a narrative of youth under Ben Ali acted to legitimise local 
structures and institutions of power, subordinating youth to their control and – by 
drawing on constructions of youth which had wider social familiarity (the family) and 
historical (nation-state building) resonance – serving to manufacture consent for that 
subordination. Youth were distinguished from older cohorts, set apart from them as 
needing a particularly watchful oversight, tasked with achieving maturity through 
service to the regime and its ambitions. The Islamist ‘threat’ conveniently recruited 
international institutions and partners to Ben Ali’s cause, building a political coalition 
which buttressed and enabled the economic project. Resistance to the political 
economy project was disenfranchised, delegitimised and discounted through the 
depiction of it as youthful storm-and-stress and the subsequent status of young people 
as necessarily less-than-autonomous.  
 
 
Youth Policy as an international project 
A final key feature of Ben Ali’s youth policy was ironically its de-politicisation. His 
strategy for promoting youth inclusion was located firmly within a discourse of a 
shared global problematic, divesting the particular Tunisian political ecology of 
responsibility for any problems of youth exclusion. At the same time, by putting 
Tunisia forwards as leading global efforts at devising appropriate youth policy, Ben 
Ali could recruit international allies in cementing both his narrative construction of 
youth and in winning ‘rent’ to offset the domestic impacts of precarious youth.   
 
Ben Ali’s list of initiatives included promoting and gaining UN endorsement for a 
World Solidarity Fund, proposing the right of youth to practice sport and physical 
activity (adopted by the UNGA), and determining 2010 as the UN International Year 
of Youth. The 2010 symposium was organised in cooperation with the Islamic 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO), the General Secretariat 
of the Arab Maghreb Union, and the Arab League Educational Cultural and Scientific 
Organisation (ALECSO). Ben Ali's speech high-lighted an important sub-text to the 
Tunisian policy discourse - that the problems faced by youth - the things "which cause 
them to feel disappointed and frustrated, and have adverse effects on their growth and 
development" were common - if imbalanced - across countries. 
 
The Tunisian regime thereby absolved itself of specific responsibilities for local 
economic, political or social failure, whilst simultaneously establishing its status as a 
good international citizen,  and off-setting criticism over the repressive political 
system and abysmal human rights record.  
 
The Euromed Youth programme was a prime example of a youth-based international 
collaborative project through which Tunisia could project itself favourably.. The 
programme focused on supporting exchanges, voluntary service and training and 
networking opportunities. Tunisian applicants had to apply through a Youth Unit 
which operated under the auspices of the MYS, conferring control over EU funding 
and prestige on the Tunisian government. Tunisia was also party to the EU’s Youth in 
Action program and the associated  SALTO-YOUTH Training Strategy which tied 
the Youth Unit into a Europe-wide network of institutions and  opportunities. 
Through these initiatives, the regime established its ‘youth-friendly’ credentials whilst 
ensuring its position as gate-keeper to international youth policy initiatives.  
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In fact, Tunisia was able to access funding through the youth agenda from a range of 
international organisations, including the Arab League Educational, Cultural and 
Scientific Organisation, the Conference of Countries with French in Common 
(CONFEGES), the Arab League, UNICEF, UNESCO, the UNDP, the World Bank 
and the African Union. Aid foundations such as the Anna Lindh and Friedrich Ebert 
Foundations also provided financial support directly to Tunisian associations, usually 
for education, training, capacity-building and consultancy/information gathering on 
youth issues (Floris, p.25).   
 
All these initiatives focused their attention on education, training, employment, 
cultural exchange, health and participation – but never representation. Following 
Tunis’ initiative, 2010 was declared the International Year of Youth by the UN, which 
produced a “Regional Overview: Youth in the Arab Region” (United Nations 2010). 
The document listed the issues and challenges facing youth in the Arab region as 
education, employment, health and participation, as well as the need for strategic 
visions for youth development and the formulation of national youth policies. 
Nowhere did the document recount the problems of authoritarianism and political 
repression, human rights abuses, sectarian or ethnic divisions endorsed by ruing 
regimes, the subordination of women, corruption, inefficient and politicised 
bureaucracies or inequalities in global trading regimes. The document ignored the 
causes of youth exclusion and focused instead on either its symptoms or palliative 
means to ease the difficulties of neo-liberal economic integration. 
Thus the international youth agenda effectively endorsed the Tunisian regime’s 
economic and political strategies, despite their negative impact upon young people.  
 
Ironically, perhaps the most revealing aspect of Ben Ali’s Youth Strategy, was the 
absence of a clearly-defined youth policy or set of policies. Floris argued in 2009 that 
“It is more accurate, in Tunisia’s case, to speak of plural strategies concerning youth 
rather than a single youth policy… there are now public programmes, without 
however, the existence of any defined youth policy” (Floris, 2009, p.9). Ben Ali had 
mastered the art of propagating a discourse of youth inclusion which served to 
reinforce the hierarchies of power embedded in existing political structures, despite 
the fact that those same structures were responsible for youth exclusion in the first 
place. Any genuine attempt to formulate a coherent national youth policy which could 
address the sources of exclusion, would have threatened both the economic strategy 
and the political structures which enabled it. Authoritarian pseudo-democratic rule 
had created  a distorted crony version of neo-liberal capitalism which was incapable 
of delivering welfare, employment or social goods to the population, forcing new 
generations into the socio-economic and political margins. The Youth Policy 
discourse was a convenient means of presenting the problems as beyond the 
government’s control, of creating new lines of patronage and incorporation to 
minimise dissent, and to win international endorsement (or stave off condemnation). 
In short, authoritarianism had disrupted the logic of the positive development model 
which might have led to more coherent and unified (if still problematic) policy-
making.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued for the utility of a political economy approach to youth which 
understands them as being the epicentre of  late capitalism’s transformation of labour 
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markets  into a precarious world of work. They are not a class in themselves but fall 
increasingly  but differentially within the global precariat depending on their 
particular intersectional identities and  local  political ecologies. Politically-managed 
constructions of youth serve to disrupt class consciousness and provide the 
manufactured consent which supports growing intergenerational inequalities in 
material wealth but also life opportunities. Youth policy has become the vehicle 
through which local and global political structures  impose their constructions of 
youth as ways to subordinate and control young workers and defuse resistance. At the 
same time, however, local (in this case authoritarian) political ecologies and context-
specific structures and hierarchies of power may themselves disrupt this process as 
they seek their own survival and enrichment through engagement with global capital.  
 
It is tempting to suggest that, in the midst of all this, a youth policy industry has 
evolved around the institutionalisation of the positive development model within 
national governments and international organisations, not unlike the Human Rights 
Industry identified in a study of the Palestinian Occupied Territories (Allen, 2013). 
The professionalization, financialisation and institutionalisation of discourses of 
human rights for Palestinians have, for Allen, created a surreal parallel world where 
everyone has learned to “talk the talk” but only as part of a complex dance around the 
reproduction of specific structures of power and flows of rent. This argument 
resonates with the case of youth policy in Tunisia: it became a discursive and 
operational instrument for national and global  power structures to reproduce their 
own neo-liberal or political dominance which were themselves the source of the 
exclusion.  
 
Returning for a moment to the matter of agency, this does not mean that the 
emancipatory aspects of the positive development model have no impact. Widening 
and prolonged education, access to global communications technologies, and the 
trickle-down effects of  liberal norms embedded in those same global institutions, 
inform young people’s aspirations,  their critiques of the political economies in which 
they live, and ultimately their capacities to resist. The position of young people at the 
forefront of the Tunisian Uprising in 2010, and their on-going efforts to establish 
themselves as autonomous political agents through that country’s political transition, 
suggest that resistance may  not, after all, be futile. 
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